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WILLIAM & MARY
BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

SYMPOSIUM
STRENGTHENING TITLE VII: 1997-1998 SEXUAL
HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION

Sexual harssment is a relatively new concept in the long history of Title VII, but
its history already has progressed over a rough, lengthy road. From its inception as
a cause of action in 1986,' sexual harassment has evolved to encompass several types
of harassment and several different configurations of plaintiffs and defendants. 2
Once applicable to limited facts, sexual harassment has become the standard-bearer
for claims of workplace discrimination.'
In its 1997-1998 Term, the United States Supreme Court added two significant
twists to the winding history of sexual harassment jurisprudence: A trilogy of
landmark cases opened Title VII to a new class of plaintiffs and made new theories'
of liability available to employees who suffer sexual harassment in the workplace.
On March 4, 1998, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
recognized a cause of action under Title VII for harassment by someone of the
victim's own sex.4 On June 26, 1998, the final day of its Term, the Court in
Faragherv. City ofBoca Raton' and BurlingtonIndustries,Inc. v. Ellerth6 tightened

See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
The concept of sexual harassment includes mens' harassment of women, womens'
harassment of men and either gender's harassment of a member of the same sex. See, e.g.,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (man harassing man);
Meritor,477 U.S. at 64-67 (man harassing woman); Walker v. Taylorville Correctional Ctr.,
129 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1997) (woman harassing man).
3 See Steven L. Willbom, Taking DiscriminationSeriously: Oncale and the Fate of
Exceptionalism in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677 (1999).
4 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-02.
5 118S.Ct.2275(1998).
6 118 S.Ct. 2257 (1998).
2
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Title VII's requirements for employers.7 The Court found that an employer could be

held vicariously liable for sexual harassment whether or not the victim had suffered
a tangible job action.8
Many feminist and employment law scholars reacted favorably to the Court's
decisions.9 They made sweeping claims that the Court's revision of Title VII causes
of action in Oncale,Faragher,and Ellerthmade sexual harassment law simple, and
that the heightened standards of employer liability would make possible a wave of
harassment claims that plaintiffs had been unable to pursue in the past." They
praised the Court's hard-line stance, the strength of its words, and the clarity of its

vision."
From the initial celebration, however, emerged a host of issues. The impact of
the decisions will depend upon the resolution of four questions: What the cases say
about sexual harassment as a distinct cause of action; how courts should interpret the
new proof structures and standards for vicarious liability articulated in Faragherand
Ellerth;what influenced the Court's thinking; and what should influence lower courts
7 See Joan Biskupic, High Court Draws Line on Sexual Harassment,WASH. POST., June
27, 1998, at A].
8 The Court further stated:
In order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability for harm caused
by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII's equally basic policies of
encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees, we
adopt the following holding in this case and in Faragherv. Boca Raton, also decided
today. An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively
higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages ....
Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (citation omitted).
9 See, e.g., Loma Brett, Voice of the People, CHI. TRIB., July 13, 1998, at 10; Linda
Greenhouse, Court Spells Out Rules for Finding Sex Harassment,N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1998, at A 1; Andrea Kay, Careers: Firms Need Effective Anti-HarassmentPolicies,CIN.
ENQUIRER, July 6, 1998, at B 13. But see Anita K. Blair, HarassmentLaw: More Confused

Than Ever, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1998, at A 14 (arguing that it is unclear what companies
may-or must--do to avoid liability for sexual harassment under Faragherand Ellerth);
Karen Brune Mathis, HarassmentRules Could Be 'Disastrous,' FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 14,
1998, at B4 (reporting law firms' concerns that Faragherand Ellerth articulate too high a

standard of conduct for corporations reasonably to demonstrate); John 0. McGinnis, Don't
Call High Court Conservative,NEWSDAY, July 27, 1998, at A27 (arguing that the Court's

decisions in Faragherand Ellerth amount to judicial legislation because they create rules of
liability that Congress did not).
'o See Janet Casto, Comment, Redefining the Parametersof Title VII in Accordance With
Equal ProtectionStandards: The United States Supreme Court's Recognition of Same-Sex
Sexual Harassmentas a Form ofDiscrimination,9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123 (1998); S.
Ashby Williams, Long Overdue: The Actionability of Same-Sex HarassmentClaims Under
Title VII, 35 HOuS. L. REV. 895 (1998).
" See Jeff Bleich et al., A Term About Something, 58 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19 (Sept. 1998).
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in their application of these decisions. The Articles in this Symposium analyze the
doctrines of Oncale, Faragher,and Ellerth and explore the implications of the
Court's new Title VII jurisprudence with the goal of providing answers to some of
these remaining issues.
I. WHAT THE CASES SAY ABOUT SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A
CAUSE OF ACTION

Steven L. Willborn's examination of Oncale indicates that the case may be
interpreted as resurrecting a long-forgotten element of the cause of action for sexual
harassment. In his Article, Taking DiscriminationSeriously: Oncale and the Fate
of Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law,"2 Professor Willborn argues that
sexual harassment liability requires a finding that actual discrimination has occurred,
yet courts have all but ignored this element for more than ten years. 3 After
discussing how sexual harassment law would function if courts required plaintiffs to
produce more evidence of discrimination than they currently must, Professor
Willborn presents a discrimination-centered model of sexual harassment law and
compares it to the law pre-Oncale. He argues that the element of actual
discrimination should be emphasized further. If courts focus on discrimination, he
says, sexual harassment will become a less exceptional cause of action for
discrimination and take its rightful place as a subset of traditional discrimination. 4
Rebecca Hanner White argues that the 1997-1998 trilogy accomplishes the result
Professor Willborn advocates. Beginning with an examination of the history of
sexual harassment jurisprudence, Professor White, in her Essay, There's Nothing
SpecialAbout Sex: The Supreme CourtMainstreamsSexual Harassment," notes that
sexual harassment has received distinctive treatment from courts and commentators.
Professor White criticizes this distinctive approach, contending that sexual
16
harassment claims simply should be analyzed as disparate treatment claims.
Professor White then examines the Court's analysis in Oncale, Faragher,and
Ellerth, and concludes that the Court has done just that. She argues that the Court's
recognition that same sex harassment can constitute sex-based discrimination and its
approach to vicarious liability for sexual discrimination represent a unification of
sexual harassment with other disparate treatment claims of discrimination."

12

See Willbom, supranote 3.

'3

See id. at 683-87.

14 See id. at 698-703, 723-24.

"s See Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing Special About Sex: The Supreme Court
MainstreamsSexual Harassment,7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725 (1999).
16

See id. at 725-30.

See id. at 730-33. "The question is not whether the harassment is sexual but whether
it is being directed against this particular individual because of his sex." Id. at 753.
17
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II. How COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET FARAGHER'S AND ELLERTH'S VICARIOUS
LIABILITY DOCTRINES

One of the Court's more striking conclusions in Faragherand Ellerth was that
employers may be held vicariously liable for supervisors' acts of harassment in
hostile environment claims. In their Article, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
Vicarious Liability under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX," Catherine Fisk and
Erwin Chemerinsky compare the Court's treatment of respondeat superior liability
in the Title VII cases of Faragherand Ellerth with its treatment of respondeat
superior liability in the Title IX case of Gebser v. Lago Vista School District.1 9
Noting that the Court's standard of liability for private employers under Title VII is
considerably higher than the standards for government liability under Section 198320
and Title IX, 2' Professors Chemerinsky and Fisk argue that a better approach to
statutory interpretation is needed in order to narrow the divide. The authors propose
that employers should be strictly liable under Title VII for supervisors' harassment
of employees, and schools should be strictly liable under Title IX for teachers'
harassment of students.22 This result, they say, would bring together the divergent
threads of liability under Title VII and Title IX and increase employers' incentive to
23
prevent harassment.
William R. Corbett explains in his Article, Faragher,Ellerth, and the Federal
Law of Vicarious Liabilityfor Sexual Harassmentby Supervisors.: Something Lost,
Something Gained,andSomething to GuardAgainst,that vicarious liability doctrine
incorporates elements of both state tort law and Title VII sexual harassment law.24
Traditionally, state law has influenced courts' findings of vicarious liability for
sexual harassment even though many courts have adopted a state-influenced Title VII
version of respondeat superior. Professor Corbett argues, however, that Faragher
and Ellerth embody a rejection of state respondeat superior law and bring vicarious
liability under a federal umbrella.25 The Title VII version of vicarious liability, he
finds, no longer enjoys its relationship with state law when the analysis is one of
supervisor liability for sexual harassment.26
J Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies.- Vicarious
Liability under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title X, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755 (1999).
19 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994).
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 795-99.
23 See id. at 799-800.
24 See William R. Corbett, Faragher,Ellerth, and the FederalLaw of Vicarious Liability
for Sexual Harassmentby Supervisors: Something Lost, Something Gained, andSomething
to GuardAgainst, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 801, 804-08 (1999).
25 See id. at 821-22.
26 See id. at 817-20.
20

21 See
22 See
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III. INFLUENCES ON THE COURTS INSEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
Sexual harassment is rapidly moving towards the forefront of employment
litigation and, as Andrew P. Morriss notes in his Article, PrivateAmici Curiaeand
2 7 it is a
the Supreme Court's 1997-1998 Term Employment Law Jurisprudence,
subject worthy of everyone's attention. Professor Morriss conducts a detailed
examination of the thirteen amicus curiae briefs that private interest groups filed in
Oncale,Faragher,and Ellerth in order to examine the amici's ability to influence the
Court. Noting that amicus briefs often lack substantiated legal, scientific, or
sociological bases for their arguments and conclusions,28 Professor Morriss makes
suggestions for how groups should make amicus briefs more useful and advocates
how the legal community should rely on these arguments to increase efficiency in the
function of the law.29
Looking to the future of Oncale, Catherine J.Lanctot demonstrates that the cases
already decided in reliance on Oncale reveal problems with attempts to deduce
Justice Scalia's intent in the majority opinion.3" It is an error,Professor Lanctot says,
to interpret the case based on Scalia's ideology or prior holdings.3 Especially in light
of the Court's unanimity in its decision, lower courts applying Oncale must use the
plain language of the decision rather than attempt to delve into underlayers of its
meaning. As the title of her Article reflects, she proposes that The Plain Meaning
of Oncale should govern the future of sexual harassment jurisprudence.3 2
CONCLUSION

No single issue of a law journal can resolve the doctrinal struggles that
accompany every major Supreme Court decision. Just as interest group lobbying,
creative lawyering, and unforeseen injustice begin the process of reforming a body
of law, theoretical discussions, retrospective analysis, and insightful questioning
begin the process of implementing the changes. They serve as a leap-off point from
which attorneys and courts can begin to analyze the new wrinkles in what was once
a familiar landscape.
The latest twists in the history of Title VII, and the analysis here of what they
mean and how they should be managed, remain raw material for practitioners and

27

See Andrew P. Morriss, PrivateAmici Curiae and the Supreme Court's 1997-1998

Term Employment Law Jurisprudence,7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823 (1999).
28 See id, at 826.
29
30

Seeid. at908-11.
See Catherine J. Lanctot, The Plain Meaning of Oncale, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.

913, 916-17, 920-21, 925-35 (1999).
31 See
32

id.
at 936-40.

See id, at 940-41.
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courts to use in the coming years. There are no definitive answers to the questions
Oncale, Faragher,and Ellerthleft-at least, not yet-but it is the hope of the William
& Mary Bill of Rights Journalthat some of their beginnings lie here.
ELIZABETHD. EVANS

